What does one learn when one acquires the grammar of a language? Most child language researchers would probably say that one learns systems of grammatical morphology and synbactic constructions, as described in terms of the researcher's preferred grammatical model. It would be noted that grammatical forms relate to semantic entities and pragmatic functions, and, depending on the theory, various roles would be allolted to semantics and pragmatics in the learner's construction of the granlmar.
cognitive diversity. Von Humboldt, like Benjamin Lee Whorf in our century, upon language as the formative instrument of thought. Both von Humboldt and were concerned with the relabion of language to world-uieu. In a characteristic looked Whorf passage from von Humboldt, he sfates (1836 Humboldt, he sfates ( /1988 ):
There resides in every language a characteristic world-uiew. As the individual sound stands between man and the object, so the entire language steps in between him and the nature that operates, both inwardly and outwardly, upon him.
Man lives primarily with objecbs, [but] he actually does so exclusively as language presenfs bhem to him.
And as whorf put it in 1940 (1956, p.221) , in the sbrongesr rerms:
Users of markedly diflerenb grammars are poinbed by their grammars bowards different Lypes of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observabion, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different view of the world.
Such a doctrine of linguistic determinism,, along with the facts oI linguistic relatiuity, implies that children who learn diflerent languages end up with different conceptual structures.
Another tradition in anbhropological linguistics takes a less deterministic approach in the face o[ linguistic diversity. Franz Boas, in his 1911 inbroduction to the Handbook of American Indian Languages, catalogued a great diversity of obligatory grammatical categories across languages. For example, he discussed the English sentence, The man is sdcfr, and noted that in Siouan one would have to indicate, grammatically, whether the man is moving or at restl in Kwakiutl one would have to indicate whether the man in question is visible or non-visible to the speaker, and near to speaker, hearer, or a third person; whereas in Eskimo one would simply say 'man sick', with no indication of definiteness, tense, visibility, or location. To remove Boas's examples from the realm of bhe exotic, note that in Spanish one has to indicate whether the man is temporarily or chronically sick; that in many European languages one cannot indicate definiteness apart from gender; and so on. What Boas made of such diversity, however, is different from the suggestions of von Humboldt and whorf (lglr/rg66, ):
The few examples that I have given here illustrate that many of the categories which we are inclined to consider as essential may be absent in foreign languages, and that other categories may occur as substitutes.
When we consider for a momenb what this implies, it will be recognized that in each language only a part of the complete concept that we have in mind is expressed, and that each language has a peculiar tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental image which is conveyed by the expression of the thought.
While von Humboldt and Whorf held that concepts have no existence independent of language, Boas suggests that there is arrcomplete concept,frexisting in the mind in the form of a rrmental image." The obligatory grammatical categories of each language apparently sample from a universal form of menbal representation, independent of any particular language. On this view, the child's task is to determine whichrraspects of the menbal imagerr are realized in the form of grammatical marking in the native language.
Was Boas right? What would a'rcomplete conceptn or'tmental imagen be like? Consider the two pictures below. These conle from the middle of a picture storybook wibhout words.t We have given this book to children and adults in a number of languages, and I will be reviewing sorne o[ our results in detail. For now, jusL look at the two pictures. They present a pair of events that you can understand immediately, probably wibhouf talking to yourself at all: something happens to the boy and somebhing happens to the dog; an owl and some bees are involved; the location is among brees.
t^,'a.,1,,, o'<al I. Consider two languages of the crosslinguistic study that I will be reporting here, English and Spanish. [f you speak English, it will be evidenb to you that the activity of the dog \s duratiue, or extended in bime, in comparison with the acrivity of the boy. In narrafive mode, you might say: ttThe boy fell from the tree and bhe dog utas running away from the bees.f' English marks progressiue aspect on the verb, and it seems thab rhis aspect corresponds to arr obvious temporal component of the'rcornplebe concepbtrorfrmental image." If you speak Spanish, you, too, will recognize the durativiby of running, because Spanish also has progressive aspect, as well as imperfecbive aspect. Bub you might also note that the falling of the boy is punctual or compleled, since your language contrasts perfective with imperfective aspect. However, what if you speak a language that has no grammatical marking of perfective/imperfective or of progressive, such as German, or Hebrew-to pick two more languages from our crosslinguistic study based on these pictures. Boas would presumably have suggested thab you are aware of the differences in ternporal contour between falling and running, but simply have no need to mark them grammatically in your language.
So far so good-but let us probe the second picbure a bit further. Consider bhe owl as an observer. In an English narrative we might say: I'The owl saw fhat the boy fell.rl Or: ff The owl saw that the dog was running." The distinction between fell and was running, I have suggested, is clearly ilinn the picture. But whab about the oul's seeing?
Note that, in both cases, in English we say 'rThe owl sau).tt But seeing musf have different temporal contours boo. And indeed, in Spanish the seeing is perfective in the first instance, imperfecbive in the second: (1r) El b.uho uio que el nino se cay6. the owl saw-PFV that the boy REFL fell-PFV [5 yrs.l (lb) EI buho ueia que el perro corria. the owl saw-IPFV that the dog ran-IPFV [5 yrs.] This will be evident to Spanish-speaking readers, as it is to Spanish-speaking preschoolers in our study-in lact, these two sentences come from a story told by a 5-year-old. But do English speakers sense thaL seeing can be perfective or imperfective? Is this parb of our rrmental image" or "complet,e conceptrr? I rather doubt it.
Let me take you once step further, this tinre into a less familiar linguisbic terrain.
Suppose you have seen only bhe second picture, and have been asked bo describe it as a past event. Descripbions in English and Spanish would probably be bhe same as in the situation in which both pictures are presented. However, this is not the case in Turkish-another language in our sample because in thab language you are obliged to choose between two past-tense inflections, one for witnessed and one for non-witnessed events. If the second picture were to be presented alone, we would witness the dog running, but we could only infer thaf bhe boy fell at an earlier point in time. As a consequence, different past tenses would appear on the two verbs:
(2^) Kopek kag-iyor-du. dog was-running-WITNESSED.PAST (2b) Qocuk diiE miie. boy feII-NONWITNESSED.PAST Turkish preschoolers are careful to make such distinctions. In English one could say, of course, something like: " lt seems that the boy fell'r or tt Apparently Lhe boy fell." We do have available optional lexical means for expressing notions bhab lie outside of the set of obligatory grammatical disbinctions in a language. But I think we would be hard-pressed to claim that everybhing about this picture that could be grammatically encoded in all of the languages of the world is implicitly present when we look at the picbure.
The Turkish evidential inflections also demonstrabe that much of grammar does not deal with mental images or perceivable reality at all. Rather, much of grammar marks distinctions that are relevant to discourse. When I speak Turkish, I must qualify my past-tense statements by telling you something about bhe source of my evidence. Furbhermore, when I present a situation to you \n any language, I take a grammaticized point of uieu. For example, in English I might say, rrThe bees are chasing the dogil or rtThe dog is being chased by bhe bees.'r Neibher of bhese viewpoints-active or passive-is in the percept. Active and passive constructions serve to organize the flow of information in connected discourse. Thus, even within a single language, grammar provides a set of options for schemabizing experience for bhe purposes of verbal expression. Any utterance is multiply determined by what I have seen or experienced, my communicative purpose in telling you about it, and the distinctions that are embodied in my grammar.
How, then, does the child know what all of these grammatical forms are about? Melissa Bowerman (1989) has suggested thab bhe grammar of the native language guides the child in discovering the notions that are relevant for speaking. Leonard Talmy (1987) has suggested that these notions are drawn from a limited set of cognitive schematizations of experience, presumably innabe. Steven Pinker (1989) has suggesbed that children know in advance what aspects of experience are likely to be grammaticized (the "Grammatically Relevant Subsystemt'), and that they use such knowledge to rtbootstraprt themselves into syntax. I bhink that all of these suggestions are in the right direction, yet we are very far from understanding how English-speaking children come to notice that events are in progress, how Turkish-speaking children come to notice that speakers communicate the source of bheir evidence, and so forth.
I do not propose bo solve bhis problem here. Having raised it, I wish bo pub ib in the background, and simply assert that each language trains the child to attend to a particular set of distinctions in the course of the acquisition of grammar. The purpose of the research I will present to you here is to demonsbrabe that, by age 3 or 4, children who have learned different native languages provide critically different descriptions of the pictures in our storybook.
In making this claim, I wish to present a new version of the von Humboldt-Whorf position on linguistic relativity and deferminism. Recall that those theorists were concerned to relate language Lo world-uiew. The classic position thus seeks bo relate two static entibies: language and thought. Language is the totality of structures described by
Iinguists. But what is "thoughttrorrrworld-view"? The hypobhesis has always run into trouble in attempts to defermine the mental structures that underlie perception, reasoning, and habitual behavior -as measured outside of bhe contexts of verbal behavior. I have a more cautious, but more manageable formulation-one that seeks to relabe two dynamic entibies: 'rthinking" and t'speaking.r' We will probably never succeed in demonsbrating bhe effects of grammar on world-view or nonlinguistic behavior. But there is a special kind of thinking that is intimately tied to language-namely, the thinking that is carried out, on-line, in Lhe process of speaking. I believe that this is the sort of relation that Boas had in mind when he wrote about selecting aspects of mental images bhat are "conveyed by the erpression of the thought." In my own formulation: The expression of experience in linguistic terms consbitutes "thinking for speaking"-a special form of thoughb that is mobilized for communication. Whatever effecbs grammar may or may not have outside of the act of speaking, the sort of mental activity that goes on while formulating utterances is not trivial or obvious, and deserves our atfention. We encounter the contents of the mind in a special way when they are being accessed for use. That is, the activity of thinking takes on a particular quality when it is employed in the activiby of speaking. In the evanescent time lrame of constructing utterances in discourse one fits one's thoughts into available Iinguistic frames. "Thinking for speakingrr involves picking those characteristics of objects and events that (a) fit some conceptualization of the event, and (b) are readily encodable in the language. I propose that, in acquiring a natiue language, the child learns particular uays of thinking lor speaking.
How can this proposal be investigated? One way is to compare Lhe ways in which speakers of different languages depict the same events in words. This approach is' well known bo students of translation, and there is a large and fascinating literature showing that translations of the same text cannot help but add or remove nuances in accord with the characteristics of the given language. Informally, we have already encountered these issues in considering various descriptions of the two pictures in several languages, and in Boas's American Indian branslations of The man is sick. We cannot ask monolingual children to carry out translations of a text, but we can ask children in different counbries to tell stories bo the same pictures, and see if their stories differ consistently, depending on the language that they are speaking. This is the method we have been using in Berkeley, in collaboration with researchers in a number of countries, using fhe picture storybook, Frog, where are you? (Mayer, 1969) . For the purposes of my present argument, I
will compare children's descriptions of several scenes in several languages, focusing on expressions of bemporal and spatial relations. Our findings suggest thab preschoolers do, indeed, give evidence of language-specific patterns of thinking for speaking, and that such patterns have implications for fhe development of rhetorical style in each of the languages.
The study was planned together with Dr. Ruth Berman of Tel-Aviv University in Israel. Table 1 lists the various researchers and languages involved. Here I will make only a few comparisons of four of these languages, in several episodes from stories told by preschoolers and 9-year-olds. I will be reporting on findings from English, German, Hebrew, and Spanish. German: ages 3, 5, 9, adult (Michael Bamberg: Clark University; Christiane von Stutberheim, Universitit Heidelberg) Hebrew: ages 3, 4, 5, 7,9, 11, adult (Ruth Berman: Tel-Aviv University) Icelandic: ages 3, 4, 5, 9, adult (Hrafnhildur Ragnarsdottir, Reykjavik) Japanese: ages 3, 4, 5,7, 9, adult (Keiko Nakamura: University of California, Berkeley) Mandarin: ages 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, adulb (Guo Jiansheng: University of California, Berkeley) Russian: ages 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, adult First let me raise the issue of rhetorical style. When you have read many of these stories in various languages, you begin to get a feeling for typical characteristics of style in each language. This can be made clear even by comparing translations inbo English. I will focus on the Lwo pictures bhat we have already examined, along with the seven following pictures in bhe Appendix. Afber the boy falls from bhe tree, he accidentally gets entangled in the anblers of a deer, with bhe result that the boy and dog fall inbo some water. The lwo following segment,s are representative of 5-year-old narratives. One is in English, and the other is an English translation of a Spanish story, where I have used the progressive to indicate the imperfective, which has no English equivalent, in order to render the version suitable in English:
(3a) First Version: The boy looked in a hole in the tree. An owl came out that threw the boy. And the dog, the bees were chasing him. The boy hid behind a rock and the owl flew away. A deer that was behind the boy when he climbed... And he slipped on top of the-the deer, while the deer was running. The dog went first. He threw them down where there was a river. Then he fell seabed.
(3b) Second version: And the boy looked in the bree. And then the boy fell out, and the owl was flying, and the dog was being chased by the bees. And then the boy gol up on some rocks, and bhe owl flew away. And the boy was calling for his frog on bhe rocks. And a deer... the boy gob caughb on the deer's anblers. And then bhe deer carried him over a cliff and threw him over the cliff into a pond. And the boy and the dog fell, and they splashed in some water.
We can be reasonably sure bhab the mental images, and understanding of the events, are roughly the same for these two children. Yet, to the practiced eye, it is evident that the first version is Spanish and the second English. What are some of the salient characteristics of these two languages, as reflected in our narrat,ives?2
The two versions are similar in their treatment,s of nrovemenb bhrough time. Bobh narratives mark some events as being in progress. [n the first, compare: threut vs. were running; in the second, fell vs. was fl.ying. (Recall that these past progressives in the translations were really past imperfectives in the Spanish original.) English and Spanish both have aspectual marking of durabivity, and 5-year-olds note this distinction. As we will see later, this feature is lacking in German and Hebrew narratives.
The two versions differ, however, in their treatmenb of locabion and movement through space. In the first version, trajectories are not highly elaborated threw the boy, slipped on top of the deer, threw down. The second version depicts more detailed trajectories: fell out, carried over a cliff, thre.u ouer the cliff into a pond, splashed in some water. By conbrast, the first version has relabive clauses that depict static locative configurations, which are lacking in bhe second: a deer that was behind the boy, where there was a riuer. There is also an encoding of the static end point of the fall: fell seated.
Note also that while the second version has no relative clauses, it has passive constructions, was being chased, got caught.
These cues are sufficient to identify the first version as Spanish and the second as English. The linguistic characteristics of these two narrative segments are typical of our preschool narratives in bhe two languages. In brief, where English allows for elaborated trajectories of motion, Spanish has simple verbs of change of location, supplemenLed by more elaborated descriptions of static locations of objects. And with regard to the syntax of non-canonical clauses, Spanish preschoolers make frequent use of.relative clauses, and English-speaking preschoolers make frequent use of passives-but for different purposes, of course. Spanish relative clauses fill in locative and circumstantial detail in cases where English may not have need for such detail, as I will discuss later with some additional examples. English passives perform the same narrative function as Spanish wordorder variation. I have given a left dislocation in the Spanish version: The dog, the bees were chasing him. This was really a standard object-fronfing word order in Spanish:
(4) Le perseguian al perro las auispas. CLITIC.PRO chased OBJECT+the dog the bees [5 yrs.] This corresponds in function to bhe English passive, The dog was being chased by the bees. Preschoolers in both languages can manipulate word order to topicalize a patient, although the construction types differ.
I want to argue fhat these systematic contrasts between Spanish and English reflect different patterns of thinking for speaking-different on-line organization of the flow of information and aftention to the particular details thab receive linguistic expression. These patterns hold up in quantitative analysis of our narratives, and show striking 2 The original Spanish of the first version is as follows: El nino mir6 por un agujero del drbol. Sali6 un loro que le tiro al nino. Y le persegu{an al perro las auispas. El niio se escondi6 detrds de una piedra y se uol6 el buho. (Jn cieruo que estaba detrds al nino como se subi6... Y se tropezo encima de la-del cieruo, mientras el cierao corr[a. Primero iba el perro. Le tiraron abajo en donde un rio. Luego se cay6 sentado.
conbrasts with languages of differenb types.
Consider, again, the scene in which the boy falls from the tree and the bees chase the dog. Here we have two simultaneous evenbs, one PUNCTUAL, COMPLETED and the ofher NON-PUNCTUAL, DURATIVE. As we have scene, English allows for an opposition between an aspectually neutral verb form and a progressive, with the neutral form taking on a default punctual value, given bhe lexical meaning of the verb fall. The descripbion in our 5-year-old example is typical:
(5) The bog fell out... and the dog was being chased by the bees. [5 yrs.] The earliest aspectual contrast in our data for this scene is given by a child of 3;8: Spanish, by providing a perfective, in addition to imperfective and progressive, thus makes it possible to grammatically mark both poles of the durative-nondurative distinction, whereas the Bnglish progressive provides explicib marking only of the durative pole.
German and Hebrew lack distinctive marking o[ either pole of the aspectual contrast. Hebrew has no grammabicized aspect at all. Verbs are simply inflected for past, present, or future bense. German has a simple past and a perfecb. Neither language has grammatical marking of either progressive or imperfective. Although German-and Hebrew-speakers must be aware, in some nonlinguistic sense, thab the temporal conbours o[ the two evenbs differ, they generally do not distinguish bhem grammatically, using the same tense for both verbs. The following examples from 5-year-olds are typical: I have given examples from 5-year-olds, but it is important to note that the language-specific patterns hold across all ages, from 3 to 9, and adults. In German and Hebrew the tendency is to maintain the same tense-aspect form for both clauses, while in Spanish and English the bendency is bo differentiabe the bwo. This trend is summarized numerically in Table 2 . Consider bhese figures in the lighb of thinking for speaking. If the figures for Hebrew and German were uniformly L007a, and for English and Spanish 07o, we could only conclude that speakers strictly adhere to the formal contrasts provided by their language, and it would not be possible to separate thinking from speaking. But bhe deviations from these extremes indicate that other options are possible.
Some Hebrew speakers try to contrast bhe two events by presenting the first in the past tense and the second in bhe present, thereby recruiting a tense difference to mark the aspectual conlrast COMPLETED-ONGOING. For example:
(11) Hebrew: Hayeled nafal ... ue hakeleu boreax.'The boy fell ... and the dog runsaway.' [5 yrs.] Note that this option is used about 707o of the time by preschoolers and adultr, *hil" school-age children (9-year-olds) follow the language most tenaciously in not attempting any aspectual distinction. (l might mention, in passing, that 9-year-old stories, across languages, tend to be the most stereotyped and consistent with native language patterns. This may well be an effect of schooling.)
German presents a similar picture to Hebrew. There are sorle attempts to mark the two verbs differently, especially in preschool narrabives. The first evenb is sometimes put in the perfect, thereby closing it off as a resultant state with regard bo bhe second evenb in bhe present tense. For example:
(12) German: Der ist uom Baum runtergefallen und der Hund liuft schnell weg.'He has fallen down lrom the tree and the dog runs away quickly.' [5 yrs.] It is interesting that fhe bendency in German is to mark bhe first evenb as completed, rather than to elaborate the second as ongoing. Only two narrators in our total sample of 48 made any atlempb bo mark the second event as protracted in fime: (13a)German: Er rannte schneller und imrner schneller. 'He ran laster and ever faster.'
[9 yrs.] (13b)German: Der Hund rennt rennt re.nnt. 'The dog runs runs runs.' [adult] ln {'act, bhroughout the narratives, it is generally the case that when German speakers choose bo take an aspectual perspective, bhey tend to orienb to some marking of boundedness. It is intriguing that, in bhe history of German, there have been various attempts to grammaticize notions of boundedness or terminative aspect. English, by contrast, has gone in z different hisborical direction among the Germanic languages, grammaticizing the progressive. And we find that our English-speaking narratives tend to mark durativity more than t,errnination in their descriptions. The relations between diachrony and child language would require a separate paper. But I would like to point out, in passing, bhaf persistence of a grammaticized notion over time in the history of a language provides anobher sort of cribical evidence that grammacical distinctions may train children bo atbend to particular rtcontenbs oI expression," to use Sapir's term. That is bo say, speakers-and hence languages become accustomed bo maintain grammatical marking of particular senrantic features.
To return to the fates of the boy and bhe dog: ib is important for my argumenb that bhe figures in Table 2 are not all l00s and 0s. The deviations from the overall tendencies of each language type show that ib is, indeed, possible to bry bo mark aspectual notions like TERMINATIVE and DURATIVE if they are not part of the regular system o[ verb morphology in one's language. And, on the other hand, the occasional lack of aspectual distinctions between the two clauses in Spanish and English shows that one is not compelled to make use of the full array of distinctions available in verbal morphology. But what is mosl striking in Table 2 is the finding that speakers so rarely make use of options that differ from the norm. Overall, Hebrew and German speakers atternpt to elaborate aspectual distinctions about one-fourbh of the time, while Spanish and English speakers fail Lo mark aspectual disbinctions about one-fourth of the bime. Such tendencies appear repeatedly, throughout our crosslinguistic study of narrative, clearly pointing to differenb types of thinking for speaking. Speakers of all ages, across languages, certainly know, in some nonlinguistic sense, that the boy's falling is punctual and completed with regard to the simultaneous, ongoing chasing and running of bees and dog. But they generally do not seem to be inclined to express any more of this knowledge linguistically than fits the available distinctions in the language. It is striking that children as young as 3 already show a sensitivity to the rrrhetorical slantrr of their particular native language.
In comparing languages in terms of aspect we find differences in terms of the number and kinds of disbinctions that are marked. The four languages we have considered can be put on a continuum wibh regard to richness of aspectual inflection: GRAMMATICAL ASPBCT Hebrew: I)one German: perfect English: perfect, progressive Spanish: perfect, progressive, imperfective/perfective When dealing with a continuum of this sort, we ask whether there is any sort of "compensationrtfor missing grammatical categories in a language, or whether they are generally ignored in thinking for speaking. Our data-across a number of story episodes and languages-suggest that categories that are nob grammaticized in the native language are generally ignored, whereas those that are grammaticized are all expressed by children as young as 3.
However, languages do not only differ from one another in the presence or absence of a grammatical category. They also differ in the ways in which they allocate grammatical resources bo common semanbic domains. Again, it will be most useful to begin with a comparison between English and Spanish. These two language represenb opposite poles of a typological distinction with regard to the verbal expression of change of location. That is, they differ critically in lexicalization patterns for verbs of motion. Consider one o[ the senbences we encountered earlier, in an English 5-year-old story: (14) And then the deer carried him over a cliff and threw him over the cliff into a pond. [5 yrs.] As Leonard Talmy (1985) has shown in detailed analyses of lexicalization patterns, the verb in English encodes some change of location in a particular manner-" throw,t' t'carry,"'rrun," etc.-leaving it totrsatellitesf'of the verb to encode directionality-in English, verb particles and prepositions. English allows for quite elaborated use of satellites to specify path with a single verb roob. The following sentence sounds perfecbly normal to native speakers:
(15) The bird flew down from out of the hole in the tree.
The verb simply specifies motion in a particular manner, and the satellites specify the trajectory:. down-from-out-of.
Spanish verbs of motion encode either directionaliLy-entrar 'enter', salir 'exit', subir'ascend', bajar'descend', etc.-or manner-oolar'fl,y', correr,'run'. But one cannot compactly express manner and directionality in compound expressions as in English, because a collection of path satellites cannot be accumulated. The closest Spanish approximation to5) w) would be something like:
(16) EI pdjaro sali6 del agujero del ,irbol uolando hacia abajo. 'The bird exited of the hole of the tree flying towards below.'
Note that Spanish prepositions, by contrast to English, provide minimal locative specification: de occurs twice in example (16). In del agujero'of the hole' it receives the meaning 'out-of' from the associated verb sa/ir 'exit', while \n del drbol 'of the tree' it receives the meaning'in'from general world knowledge about relations between holes and trees. When world knowledge is not sufficient, the Spanish-speaker is often required to provide a static rrskebchil of the relevant components of scene, so thab the apropriate trajectory can be inferred. As we will see, this accounts, in part, for the flowering of relative clauses in Spanish. For example, in English one might say:
(17) The boy put the frog down into a jar.
A Spanish-speaker might say:
(18) EI nino meti6 Ia rana en el frasco que habia abajo. 'The boy inserted the frog en [:it /on] the jar that was below.'
The verb meter'inserb'implies bhat the proposition en is to be interprebed as'in'; and the relative clause, que habia abajo'that was below', implies the directionality of inserbion. Thus in Spanish the trajectory 'down-inbo' must be inferred from a combination o[ path-verb and a static description of the locabion of lhe goal-the jar, while in English the stabic location of the goal-located in the jar-must be inferred from bhe pathdescription, down into. This is a systematic diflerence between the two languages. English tends to assert trajectories, leaving resultant locative states to be inferred; Spanish tends to assert locations and directions, leaving trajectories to be in[erred. This systematic difference has effects on the grammar of discourse. I have already menbioned the Spanish use of locative relative clauses. Another effect is in bhe use of Spanish participles, which are frequenb at the youngest ages. We have already encountered one typical example in the firs[ narrabive fragment, where the 5-year-old narrator said that the boy'fell seabed': (tg) Se cay6 sentado.'(He) fell seated.' [5 yrs.] This child is trying to take a perspective that includes bobh motion and endstate. More lypically, we find clauses in which the only lexical verb is a parbiciple. For example, where English-speakers tend to say The boy climbed the tree, leaving the boy's end-stabe implicit, Spanish speakers often say the untranlatable E/ nino estd subido en el drbol 'The boy is climbed-PART in bhe tree'. Thus, at many poinbs in our narratives, English-speakers assert actions, implying results, whereas Spanish-speakers assert results, implying actions. These differences come to have an effect on overall rhetorical style. English narrators devote somewhat more narrative attention to descriptions of processes, while Spanish narrators tend to provide more descriptions of states. In making this proposal, houeuer, let me remind you that I am talking about thinking for speaking only. I am making no claims about how millions ol Spanish-and English-speakers conceiue of life or act in the uorld.
In our small sample of narratives to the Frog, where are you? picture-book, there are some suggestive differences by age and language with respect to the issues of location and motion thab I have been briefly reviewing. First let us consider the issue of verbs of motion and their satellites. The analysis can be enriched by adding German and Hebrew, since German patberns itself like English-with undirected verbs of motion and a rich and differenbiated collection of locative particles and prepositions; and Hebrew patterns itself like Spanish with directional verbs and a small collecbion of polysemous preposibions.
There are three episodes in the story in which someone falls or is thrown downward. We have seen two of them-the fall from bhe tree and the fall from the cliff; and in my calculations I have added a third, in which the dog falls from a window. I have listed all o[ the verbs used to describe these scenes (mainly versions of 'fall' and 'throw') in English, German, Spanish, and Hebrew. For each verb, I noted whether it occurred alone, or with some kind of locative addition-a particle or prepositional phrase indicating downward direction, source, or goal of motion. In Table 3 you see the figures for 3-, 5-, and 9-year-olds, giving the percentages of such descriptions that had a bare verb with no locabive elaboration. It is clear that, for psycholinguistic purposes, typological differences between languages must be considered separately for each semantic domain. The ways in which a language deals with issues of time may be quite differenb from its treatment of space, which casts some doubt on Whorf's grand overall conception of language and world-view. Table 3 shows that English and German 3-year-olds hardly ever use a verb of motion without some locative elaboration, whereas Spanish and Hebrew 3-year-olds use bare verbs of motion about two-thirds of the time. This clear difference in narrative strategy holds up across age as well. Although there are different developmental patterns, at each of the three ages the difference between the two types of languages is maintained.
The most interesting developmental pattern is seen in Spanish. Here there id a Ushaped curve, with 5-year-olds providing relatively more locative elaboration than either 3-or 9-year-olds. Some children of this age seem to be groping for more detailed description of trajectories, using English/German construction types that are redundant in These can be looked upon as abtempts to compensate for an apparent gap in Spanish grammar. But bhey are differenb from the atbempts at compensation that we encountered with regard to verbal aspect. There we found a few, rare instances of German and Hebrew attempts to odd distinctions of punctuality or durativity that are not marked grammatically in bhe language. But here we have attempts bo be more explicit, using tools that are part of the grammar.
Interestingly, these attempts disappear after age 5 in Spanish. They seem to be replaced by the use of extended static locative descriptions, which make it possible to infer trajectories from the combination of a motion verb and the description of a scene. The following 9-year-old example is typical:
(22) El cieruo le lleu6 hasta un sitio, donde debajo habia un rio. Entonces el cieruo tir6 al perro y al nino al rio. Y despu,ls, cayeron. 'The deer took him until a place, where below there was a river. Then bhe deer bhrew the dog and the boy to the river. And then, they fell.'
[9 yrs.] Table 4 summarizes the use of elaborated locative descriptions in narrating the fall from the cliff. (23a).9o the deer ran auay with him and dropped him off a clifr in the water. And they lell in the water. [9 yrs.] (z3b)And the deer ran with the boy on his antlers. So the dog was chasing the deer, and the deer just stopped, and the boy and the dog lell ofr ol a cliff inlo a suamp. [9 YTS.] German 9-year-olds are strikingly similar to Americans, with little static scene-setting and compact verbal constructions that sketch out a trajectory. For example:
\24) Der Hirsch nahm den Jungen auf sein Geweih und schmiB ihn den Abhang hinunter genau ins Wasser. 'The deer took the boy on his antlers and hurled him down from the cliff right into the water.' [9 yrs.] Finally, to complete the picture, 9-year-old Israelis are strikingly similar to Spanas can be seen from the following Hebrew example:
Ve ha'ayil nithal, ve hu hitril laruts. Ve hakeleu rats ararau, ue hu higia lemacok she mitarat haya bitsa, ue hu atsar, ue hayeled ue hakeleu naflu labitsa beyarad. 'And the deer was startled, and he began to run. And the dog ran after him, and he reached a cliff thab had a swamp underneath, and he stopped, and the boy and bhe dog fell to the swamp together. [9 yrs.] To reburn to my overall theme once again, these two types of languages seem to have important consequences wibh regard bo thinking for speaking. In this instance, the unavailabiliby of a particular grammatical device a system of locative particles related to verbs-has rather large potential consequences for narrabive organization. Spanish-and Hebrew-speaking children develop procedures of scene-setbing, in which a vaguely iards, (25 ) specified change of location becomes interpretable in context. One grammatical device which serves this function is relative clauses, and we find that Spanish-and Hebrewspeakers use relative clauses far more frequently than English-and German-speakersThis is already evident at age 3, indicating early development of a narraLive style in which descripbion and qualification are inrportant.
Of course, I must be cautious in making large generalizations lrom a rather small sample of stories told to a single picbure-book in several countries. I would like to comment, though, that the patterns we have found in Spain seem to hold up in comparable data gathered by Aura Bocaz in Chile and Argentina, and that the Bnglish patterns are repeated in several different American samples. Much more needs to be done even with lhe Frog, where are you? picture book in the remaining languages in our sample, let alone necessary additions of other speech genres and languages.
I am convinced, however, that the events of this little picture book are experienced differently by speakers of different languages--iz the process of making a uerbalized story out of them. For example, there is nothing in the pictures themselves that leads English speakers to verbally express whether an event is in progress or Spanish speakers to note whether it has been completed; to encourage Germanic speakers to formulate elaborate descriptions of trajectories; to make Hebrew speakers indifferent to conceiving of events as durabive or bounded in time. (And, if we went on to examine our Russian and Turkish stories, we would find an indifference to indicating the definiteness of story parbicipants-a category readily marked by our English, German, and Spanish narrators.) I suggest that, in acquiring each of these languages, children are guided by the set of grammaticized distinctions in the language to attend to such features of events while speaking.
There is, however, something dissatisfying in limiting ourselves to evidence that is so bound up with the acquisition and use of native languages. In conclusion, I would like to point to another type of evidence that seems bo support my proposal that the ways in which learning a language as a child constrains one's sensitivity to what Sapir called'rthe possible contents of experience as expressed in linguistic terms. "
Consider the small collection of linguistically encoded perspectives that we have been examining: temporal contours of events marked by aspecbual forms, movement and trajectories in space, indication of definiteness of participants mentioned in connected discourse. These are precisely the sorts of things bhat make it so hard to master the grammar of a second language. For example, it is very hard for English-speakers to grasp the Spanish perfective/imperfective distinction that is lacking in our native language. [n fact, we seem never to fully master this system in Spanish. By contrast, we have little difficulty in figuring out how to use the Spanish progressive and perfect, or the Spanish definite and indefinibe articles-since we have already learne<l how bo make decisions aboub the linguist,ic expression o[ bhese notions in English. But Lhere is nothing inherently easy or hard abouL any of these Spanish distinctions. For example, native French speakers have no trouble with the Spanish imperfective, since they have a similar category in French; but the progressive and perfect pose problems to them, since these are not French ways of looking at events. Turkish speakers have difficulty with definibe and indefinite articles in learning to speak Spanish, English, and German, since there are no definite articles in Turkish. German speakers of English use the progressive where they should use simple present, although Turks do not make this error in English, since Turkish uses progressive aspect and German does nob. Spanish learners of English object that we make too many obscure distinctions with our large collection of locative prepositions and particles. And so on. In brief, each native language has trained its speakers to pay differenb kinds of attenbion to events and experiences when talking about them. This braining is carried out in childhood and is excepbionally resistant to restructuring in adult second-language acquisibion.
Much of value could be learned from a systematic study of those systems in particular second languages that speakers of particular first languages find especially difficult to master. I think thab these systems--including the ones we have considered here-have something important in common: they cannot be experienced directly in our perceptual, sensorimotor, and practical dealings with the world. I would guess, for example, that if your language lacked a plural marker, you would not have unsurmountable difficulty in learning to mark the category of plurality in a second language, since this concept is evident to the nonlinguistic mind and eye. Or if your language lacked an instrumental marker it should not be difficult to learn to add a grammabical inflection to nouns that name objects manipulated as instruments. Plurality and manipulation are notions that are obvious to the senses. Bub there is nobhing in everyday sensorimotor interactions with the world that changes when you describe an event as ttShe went to worktt or ilShe has gone to work,rt or when you refer bo the same object in successive utterances as "o carrf and ttthe car.tt Distinction of aspect, definiteness, voice, and the like, are par excellence, distinctions that can only be learned through language, and have no other use except to be expressed in language. And, further, once our minds have been trained in taking particular points of view for the purposes of speaking, it is exceptionally difficult to be retrained.
It is interesting that Wilhelm von Humboldt anticipated these questions as well. He wrote (1836/1988, p. 60 
):
To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new standpoint in lhe world-view hitherto possessed, and in fact to a certain extent this is so, since every language contains the whole conceptual fabric and mode of presentabion of a portion of mankind. But because we always carry over, more or less, our own world-view, and even our own language-view, this outcome is not purely and complebely experienced. 
Conclusion
In sum, we can only falk and undersland one another in terms of a particular language. The language or languages that we learn in childhood are not neutral coding systems of an objective reality. Rather, each one is a subjective orientation to the world of human experience, and this orientation affects the ways in which ue think while we are speaking.
